Summits and Valleys
峰谷之间——美国总统中东斡旋记
By Peter Grier ■东篱
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For nearly 25 years, US presidents have struggled
to broker peace between the Israelis and Palestinians. A special report
retraces the successes and breakdowns...
As he sat at the evening banquet, held outside
in the soft air of Washington's spring, President Jimmy Carter1
was thrilled to see bitter enemies welcome each other as friends. Earlier
that day — March 26, 1979—President Anwar Sadat of Egypt and Prime Minister
Menachem Begin of Israel had signed the Camp David accords2,
formally ending the state of war that had existed between their countries
for 31 years. Now, they were mingling on the White House lawn, glasses
and plates in hand, swapping tales of old wars.3
At one point, Shaul, son of Israeli Defense Minister
Ezer Weizman, approached the head table to pay his respects. While serving
with Israeli forces years earlier, Shaul had been severely wounded by
Egyptian fire. But on this night, the leader of Egypt's armies, Mr.
Sadat himself, rose and embraced him.
That heady moment may represent the high point
of American peacemaking in the Middle East.4
Just ask President George W. Bush and Secretary
of State Colin Powell. They might say that today the Mideast "burden"
is as heavy as ever.
Virtually every US President since Carter has entered
office determined to avoid mediation in one of the most explosive areas
of the world. Virtually all ended their terms hip-deep in the search
for solutions to the conflict between Israel on the one side and Palestinians
and Arab states on the other.5
Why is this so? The combatants themselves push
it, for one thing. The United States has historic ties to both Israel
and moderate Arab states such as Saudi Arabia.6
The Israelis tend to distrust the European Union, Russia, and most other
possible mediators. The Palestinians believe that only the US has the
power to get Israel to do something it doesn't really want to do.
Also at stake7 are US
national interests in the region. A conflagration in the Mideast would
threaten the industrial world's access to Gulf oil.8
It could threaten the security of Israel, a state with strong cultural
and political ties to America. During the cold war, US officials worked
hard to limit Soviet influence with the Arabs. Truth be told, they probably
want to muscle out9 other big-power rivals,
even benign ones, today.
But there may be an "X" factor10 at work
as well. A cold calculation of geopolitics does not explain Jimmy Carter
poring endlessly over maps of the Sinai, personally drawing possible
lines of Israeli-Egyptian disengagement.11
It does not explain why President George Bush's Secretary of State,
James A. Baker, would sit through a 9-1/2 hour meeting with Syria's
Hafez al-Assad (Mr. Baker's aides invented "important" phone
calls so they could use the lavatory).12
Nor do policy concerns entirely explain President
Clinton devoting more time to face-to-face Mideast peace negotiations
than any US leader, ever, even as the prospect of success receded13
in the distance.
In the end, US presidents and their closest aides
can become personally immersed in the Mideast peace process. It is big.
It is interesting. Their views matter. Presidents drive US policy, serving
as the swing vote between a reliably pro-Israeli Congress and a State
Department bureaucracy more in tune with Arab views.14
George W. Bush hasn't yet gone as far down this
road as did Bill Clinton—or even Bush's father. But having inserted
his administration into the search for an end to the current round of
violence ... well, has there been a recent White House that became less
involved with the search for Mideast peace, over time?
"The bottom line is that for 35 years, the
US and its leaders have played an essential, critical, vital role in
the region. That's happening with Bush and Colin Powell today,"
says Kenneth Stein, a chief Middle East adviser.
From this historical topography15
of US peacemaking in the Middle East, there are a number of general
conclusions an interested member of the Bush administration might draw
as this White House feels its way through the current crisis:16
No. 1: US mediation in this volatile17
area of the world is crucial. Egypt and Israel would never have struck
a deal18 in 1979 without Carter's persistence.
Though he once bemoaned his role as a "postman" in the talks,19
he provided a crucial link between Sadat, who was more interested in
concluding a deal than his aides, and Begin's top aides, who were more
interested in concluding a deal than their boss.
No. 2: The big breakthroughs don't always come
from White House pressure. Sadat's dramatic personal trip to Jerusalem
set the stage for Camp David in the first place. US mediation may have
made the Oslo accords20 possible, but they
were struck in secret, in Scandinavia. Secretary of State Christopher
first heard of them while on vacation in California.
No. 3: They really don't like each other. Carter
found that Sadat and Begin so mistrusted each other that direct talks
were counterproductive.21 At Camp David II22,
Clinton thought that direct contact between Barak and Arafat would create
positive momentum. It didn't. Appeals to common fellowship are very
American, but in the Middle East, they don't work. Negotiators have
to focus on substance, not personality.23
No. 4: There is no reverse gear24
on US involvement. The Bush administration must be debating what approach
to take next, following Secretary of State Powell's return from the
region without a hoped-for cease-fire. Whatever happens—whether it be
a pause in US action or more intensive engagement—it probably won't
be a complete diplomatic withdrawal. Consider Powell's own prophetic
words, from his Louisville speech:25
"The Middle East has always needed active American engagement for
there to be progress, and we will provide it, just as we have for over
half a century."
1. 吉米·卡特,美国第39任总统。
2. 1979年埃及总统萨达特和以色列总理贝京签署了戴维营和平协议,其中规定了西奈半岛的归属、在约旦河西岸与加沙地带建立自治政权、以及两国和平前景等问题。
3. mingle:相交往,相往来;swap:交换。
4. heady:感人的,给人深刻印象的;high
point: 顶点,极限。
5. 自卡特之后的几乎每一任美国总统执政之初都决心不插手这一世界上最危险地区的事务,而最终在任期结束时几乎都深陷其中,寻求解决以色列与巴勒斯坦及阿拉伯国家之间冲突的办法。mediation:斡旋,调解;explosive:爆发的,爆发性的。
6. 沙特阿拉伯。
7. at stake:受到威胁。
8. 中东地区爆发战争会对工业世界获取波斯湾的石油构成威胁。Gulf:
指世界上最大的石油出产地区波斯湾;conflagration:/;k0nfl2#grei12n/:(战争等的)爆发。
9. muscle out:<美俚> 强行逐出。
10. 未知因素。
11.吉米·卡特不停地研究西奈半岛的地图,并亲自为以埃分离划出一些可能的分界线,这可不是什么对地缘政治的客观分析。pore
over:钻研,专心阅读;disengagement:分离,脱离。
12. 贝克先生的助手们谎称有“重要”电话,这样他们才能出去上厕所。
13. recede:变得渺茫。
14. 总统操纵美国政策,决定着是按亲以色列的国会的意志行事还是按更倾向于阿拉伯人的国务院的意愿行事。swing:有决定性影响的;reliably:可依赖地,可信地。
15. topography:地形描绘。这里指对美国调解中东和平的历史的详细剖析。
16. 当本届美国政府在目前的中东危机中摸索出路的时候,布什政府中有兴趣的人也许能得出一些主要结论。
17. volatile:变化无常的,易变的。
18. strike a deal:达成交易、合同等。
19.尽管他曾哀叹说自己在中东对话中扮演的仅仅是个“信差”的角色。
20. Oslo accords:1993年巴以签署奥斯陆协议,确定了“土地换和平”原则、在加沙和西岸建立巴勒斯坦国,并承认以色列享有建立安全边界的权利。
21.两人彼此极其不信任,让他们直接对话只会适得其反。counterproductive:产生相反结果或效果的。
22.应克林顿总统的邀请,巴以首脑于2000年7月在戴维营第二次会晤,就巴以达成永久性和约前的过渡阶段和最后阶段,巴建国,巴难民和耶路撒冷地位等几个问题上进行会谈。
23. 诉诸于共同的伙伴关系是典型美国人的做法,在中东,这却行不通。中东的谈判代表所必须注重的是实质内容,而非个人性格。fellowship:伙伴关系,交情。
24. reverse gear:[机]回动齿轮,逆转装置。暗喻逆转力。
25. prophetic:预言性的,预示的;Louisville:路易(斯)维尔(美国肯塔基州北部城市)。